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The Determinants of 
Revenue Performance 
Roy BahI and Jorge Martinez- Vazquez 
Property taxation in developing countries is a fiscal paradox. On the one hand, it seems to he everyone's candidate for the primary source of local government revenue. On the other hand, the property tax is little used 
in developing countries. In this chapter, we ask about the determinants of 
this gap between expectations and reality, and speculate about what this 
means for the future. 
WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR ADVOCACY? 
The a priori case for heavier use of the property tax at the subnational level 
in developing and transitional countries is a strong one. There is much to 
recommend a greater reliance on this revenue source.1 
Correspondence 
The property tax has the desirable feature that much of the tax burden is 
likely borne by residents in the jurisdiction where the services financed by 
property taxes are provided. This property of correspondence between ex­
penditure benefits and tax burdens is an important characteristic of a good 
local tax. In this case the local governments who levy the tax are more likely 
' For discussions of the case, see Bahl and Linn (1992) and Bird (2004). 
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to be fiscally responsible, that is, to be less likely to overspend on the expec­
tation that tax exporting would allow them to pass some of the tax burden 
to the residents of other jurisdictions. Only a few other taxes, such as taxes 
on motor vehicle use, payroll taxes, and user charges, possess this important 
characteristic. 
The reality of correspondence advantage of the property tax might be 
challenged. To the extent that the property tax is concentrated on nonresi­
dential property, and if improvements (versus land) are a significant com­
ponent of the tax base, there is a greater potential for exporting the burden 
to other regions. This happens when businesses sell outside the region and 
are able to pass the taxes on to consumers, when landlords are absentee 
owners, and so on. In countries where only industrial-commercial proper­
ties are taxed, the potential for exporting the property tax burden is greater, 
and the property tax is a less suitable local government levy. 
The Benefit Argument 
A second reason why the property tax is a good match for local govern­
ments is that it might be seen as a quasicharge for services provided. Busi­
nesses and some residential owners may perceive that they benefit from cer­
tain public investments approximately in proportion to the value of their 
properties. For example, property values may be higher, other things being 
equal, in areas where street lighting is functional, policing is better, schools 
are of higher quality, and so on. It follows that there is a sense in which 
property taxes paid roughly correspond to benefits received. This of course 
assumes that property is correctly valued to reflect the betterment associ­
ated with public investments and regularly provided public services, that 
valuations are regularly updated, that land markets function, and that bene­
fiting properties are not routinely exempted through the political process. It 
also assumes that property owners/taxpayers believe that this link between 
tax base and benefits received is more or less accurate. 
Revenue Potential and Stability 
A major constraint to successful decentralization is the absence of a strong 
independent revenue source for local governments—one that is revenue 
productive and one that the higher level governments are willing to turn 
over to local governments. The property tax can fit this bill. 
Certainly, the property tax has the potential to be a significant revenue 
producer for subnational governments. In the case of Canada and the 
United States, property tax revenues reach up to 3 percent to 4 percent of 
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gross domestic product (GDP). The value of land and improvements consti­
tutes a broad base that is growing in virtually all countries, and even a mod­
est statutory tax rate can yield a very significant amount of revenue.2 How­
ever, the realization of large amounts of revenue requires a willingness to 
impose the property tax at higher levels than now exist, plus it requires a 
good valuation system and a high rate of compliance, which implies a strong 
program of enforcement. As we discuss later, industrialized countries have 
realized this revenue potential to a much greater extent than have develop­
ing and transitional countries, mostly because of their valuation and en­
forcement systems, but also because of the extent to which they have com­
mitted to fiscal decentralization. 
Another positive feature of property taxation as a revenue source, and 
one that makes it especially attractive for subnational governments, is the 
relative stability of its tax base. Fluctuations in prices, income, and employ­
ment tend to have a much bigger impact on tax bases such as payrolls, prof­
its, and sales than they have on property values. And the fluctuation in tax­
able property values is even less because revaluations are infrequent and do 
not closely follow the business cycle. This is an important consideration for 
local governments that often are charged with providing essential services 
and have no recourse to deficit financing. 
The Politics of Assignment 
Central governments resist giving up control over important tax bases to 
their local governments. They argue that 
• the resource constraints are more sever at the center, especially given the 
higher priority services to be delivered; 
• subnational governments do not have a comparative advantage in admin­
istering these taxes; and 
• macroeconomic policy dictates that these revenue sources should be held 
to the center. 
In most countries the property tax seems to be exempt from these argu­
ments. The value of land and improvements is not a tax base that the cen­
tral governments covet; hence, they often seem content to leave it to local 
2 For example, Hernando de Soto (2000) estimates that the total value of Africans' informally owned 
houses and farmland in 1997 was roughly $1 trillion, or nearly three times sub-Saharan Africa's an­
nual GDP. However, much of this tax base in developing countries is subject to informal property 
rights, which does not help with the willingness to pay taxes. As reported in The Economist, January 
15, 2004, "In Africa ... less than 10% of the continent's land is formally owned, and barely one 
African in ten lives in a house with title deeds." 
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governments.3 The reasons for this more or less common behavior among 
central authorities are far from clear. Although the central authorities may 
see the wisdom of assigning this tax to local governments, it also could be 
that their lack of interest in the property tax lies in the calculus of central 
officials regarding revenue potential versus political cost. Or it could reflect 
the central government's view about the complexity of administration and 
the low revenue potential of this tax. 
Other Advantages 
There are other desirable features of the property tax, though they do not 
necessarily argue for assignment to local governments. 
Vertical Equity 
The property tax might also be seen as vertically equitable in developing 
and transitional countries. In fact, the property tax can be progressive in de­
veloping countries, and therefore can increase the overall vertical equity of 
the tax system (Bahl 1998; Bahl and Linn 1992; Sennoga, Sjoquist, and Wal­
lace 2006). There are several reasons for this. Property ownership is heavily 
concentrated among the wealthy in developing countries, and property 
owners are often not reached by the income tax system. The property tax 
has the potential of filling the gap. On the basis of the high level of concen­
tration of ownership, a tax on the land value base would seem to be the 
most progressive. At the other end of the income distribution spectrum, 
public housing and low-valued properties are generally not taxed at all, 
which also adds to the progressivity of the tax. 
However, property taxes in less developed countries can be made regres­
sive by exemption policies that target the well-to-do, such as in the case of ex­
empting owner-occupied properties. Preferential assessment (or exemption) 
of certain commercial or industrial properties may have the same effect. The 
distributional effects of the property tax, then, are heavily influenced by the 
rate and base structure of the tax, as well as by its administration. These are 
factors that government can control, to some extent. 
Compliance Costs 
The property tax has the advantage that it imposes a relatively low compli­
ance cost on taxpayers because taxpayers play a limited role in determining 
tax liability, except in the case of appeals. Unlike most other taxes that tend 
3 This is not always the case. For example in China, Indonesia, and Jamaica, the property tax is a cen­
tral government levy, even though local governments receive most of the revenue. 
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to be self-assessed, such as income tax or value-added tax (VAT), property 
taxes are assessed by the tax authorities; therefore, the compliance costs are 
largely shifted to the assessing authority and hilling authorities.4 
Sometimes compliance costs arise because of harassment of taxpayers hy 
corrupt officials who are charged with setting taxable values or with collec­
tion. In the case of Bangalore, India, the argument is that the reality of cor­
respondence advantage of the property tax might he challenged. To the ex­
tent that the property tax is concentrated on nonresidential property, and if 
improvements (versus land) are a significant component of the tax base, 
there is a greater potential for exporting the burden to other regions. This 
happens when businesses sell outside the region and are able to pass their 
taxes on to consumers, when property owners are absentee owners, and un­
der other conditions. In countries where only industrial-commercial prop­
erties are taxed, the potential for exporting the property tax burden is 
greater, and the property tax is a less suitable local government levy. 
Land Use Efficiency 
Finally, a property tax might be thought of as a charge for land that can lead 
to significant improvements in the quality of land use. Particularly if land is 
taxed according to its location value in urban areas and if assessment is at 
its highest and best use, a more rational allocation of land use will occur. 
This was the reasoning behind the Chinese adoption of a land use charge. 
Here the land value version of property taxation has a particular advantage. 
In developing countries, however, the effective rate of taxation is so low that 
these incentives are not likely to be effective. 
REVENUE PERFORMANCE 
Despite the a priori potential, property taxes are far from being a mainstay 
of the revenue system in developing and transitional countries. On average, 
as shown in table 3.1, property taxes in developing and transitional coun­
tries raise less relative to GDP than is the case of countries of the Organisa­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the early 
2000s, property taxes in OECD countries represented 2.12 percent of GDP, 
whereas for developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent and for transi­
tional countries, 0.68 percent. Averages do lie, and there are significant 
outliers in these country groupings, but for the most part, less developed 
4 In many developing and transitional countries, property taxes are assessed by a central authority, 
but billed and collected by the local authorities. 
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TABLE 3.1 Property Tax as Share of GDP (Percent) 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
OECD countries 1.24 1.31 1.44 2.12 
(number of countries) 16 18 16 18 
Developing countries 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.60 
(number of countries) 20 27 23 29 
Transitional countries 0.34 0.59 0.54 0.68 
(number of countries) 1 4 20 18 
All countries 0.77 0.73 0.75 1.04 
(number of countries) 37 49 59 65 
Note: The average of 2000s data is retrieved from data for the years 2000 and 2001. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
countries do not approach OECD countries in the intensity of use of the 
property tax. 
It is interesting that the trend for all three categories of countries has 
been slightly upwards since the 1970s (i.e., the revenue-income elasticities 
have been positive). However, the gap between the industrialized and the 
developing countries has widened. 
The data in table 3.1 strongly suggest that reliance on the property tax 
comes with economic development (e.g., compare OECD with developing 
countries). Some OECD countries make especially heavy use of the prop­
erty tax. For example, Canada raises a revenue amount equivalent to about 
4 percent of GDP, and the United States raises nearly 3 percent of GDP. 
This pattern of variation among countries in the intensity of use of the 
property tax is explored later in a more systematic way. 
Even though the property tax is not intensively used in the revenue 
structures in developing countries, it often contributes significantly to fi­
nancing subnational governments. The results presented in table 3.2 for the 
percentage of total subnational expenditures financed by property taxes are 
particularly interesting. Developing countries may not use the property tax 
more intensely than do OECD countries, but they would appear to rely 
more heavily on the property tax to finance subnational government expen­
ditures. This finding, which will come as a surprise to many, gives a differ­
ent perspective about the importance of strengthening the practice of prop­
erty taxation in the developing countries. It suggests that a foundation is in 
place for the revenue importance of the property tax to be ratcheted up by 
assigning more expenditure responsibility to the subnational governments. 
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TABLE 3.2 Property Tax as Share of Total Subnational Government 
Expenditures (Percent) 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
OECD countries 9.7 9.88 13.65 12.40 
(number of countries) 16 17 16 19 
Developing countries 18.65 15.97 13.49 18.37 
(number of countries) 21 27 24 20 
Transitional countries 3.67 4.92 7.75 9.43 
(number of countries) 1 4 18 20 
All countries 14.49 12.89 11.63 13.40 
(number of countries) 38 48 58 59 
Note: The data tor 2000s are for the five years from 2000 to 2004. 
Sources: Columns 2 and 3 are based on International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook {GFS), 2002; columns 4 and 5 have been calculated from GFS. 
The fact that developing countries finance about 18 percent of subnational 
government spending from the property tax is a reflection of relatively 
lower subnational government expenditure share in developing countries 
and that subnational governments in developing countries generally have 
fewer options for local taxes hy comparison with OECD countries. For ex­
ample, local government income taxes are a common revenue source at the 
subnational level in OECD countries. 
The averages shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2 tend to hide considerable lev­
els of variation in the use of property taxes within each of the three cate­
gories of countries represented there.5 What we will ask later is, besides 
the level of economic development, what other external and institutional 
factors may help explain variations in the use of property taxes. 
WHY SO FEW TAKERS? 
There are major drawbacks to the use of property taxes in developing and 
transitional countries. Particularly the administrative constraints and how 
the tax is actually perceived by taxpayers go a long way toward explaining 
the relatively low revenue dependence on this tax by governments in devel­
oping countries. 
5 See Bird and Slack (2004) and Malme and Youngman (2001) for descriptions of individual country 
property taxes. 
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Administration Cost 
The major problem with the property tax is that it is difficult to administer 
and costly if administered well. A high administrative cost and a small rev­
enue yield tend to make a good property tax a losing proposition. Moreover, 
higher level governments have an interest in keeping the political fallout to 
a minimum, and this goal may not be consistent with a well-administered 
property tax. 
The result of these considerations is that in most developing and transi­
tional countries, property taxes are badly administered. As we discuss in a 
later section of this chapter, the norm would seem to he that both assess­
ment ratios and collection rates in developing countries are very low. This 
leads to unfairness in terms of how various categories of taxpayers are 
treated, to significant revenue leakage, and to a loss in confidence by tax­
payers in their revenue source. 
Property taxes cannot be self-assessed; hence, a very high staff cost is im­
plied, and a great deal of information and record keeping is required. Signif­
icant administrative costs are also associated with collections and appeals. 
Compounding the problem, there is a shortage of property assessors in vir­
tually all developing countries. Thus, when administrative costs are com­
pared with revenue yield, even in the best of circumstances, the property 
tax easily can seem a poor financing choice for local governments. 
Enforcement 
The property tax is difficult to enforce. Elected local officials are often not in 
a position to take actions against delinquent taxpayers because they are not 
provided with adequate penalties to do so. Moreover, those who are not in 
compliance may be leaders in the community, and local politicians may be 
hesitant to aggressively enforce penalties. 
Potentially effective solutions to penalizing those who are out of compli­
ance, such as confiscation of property, may be considered too extreme and 
generally are not feasible because of the political fallout. The special attach­
ment to land in many developing countries raises the possibility that broad-
based acceptance of a more intensively used property tax is not likely. This 
problem is much like the problem of collecting user charges for services con­
sidered essential (e.g., housing, water, electricity). Ultimately, it becomes an 
issue of political will, and very few developing and transitional countries 
have been able to exercise that will. However, there are exceptions; for ex­
ample, South African local authorities have in the past used the threat of 
cutting off electricity for failure to pay the property tax or the utility bill. 
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Taxpayer Attitudes 
More generally, a major constraint to increased use of the property tax is its 
unpopularity with voters. Per dollar of revenue raised, property taxes may 
generate more negative reaction than any other levy does. There are several 
reasons for this degree of unpopularity. One is that the tax is levied on (un­
realized) accretions to the wealth of an individual or a business, and these 
accretions do not necessarily correspond to income received. The holding of 
some other forms of property, for example, stocks or other financial assets, 
is taxed only upon realization. This creates not only special implementation 
problems (e.g., how to treat those living on fixed incomes), but it also cre­
ates a general hostility toward this tax. 
The unpopularity of the property tax is also a result of the judgmental 
approach to assessment that is taken almost everywhere. A proposed in­
crease in the tax rate on a base that is determined in uncertain or even 
mysterious ways is hound to provoke negative reactions. Finally, the tax is 
unpopular because it is so visible. Income tax is subject to withholding, 
but even so, most taxpayers may not be able to accurately report their an­
nual payment. Consumption taxes are paid in small increments and are of­
ten obscured in the final price of the merchandise. Most people could not 
even guess at the annual amount of VAT that they may pay. The property 
tax, on the other hand, is highly visible. It is usually billed annually or 
quarterly, and property owners are much more likely to know exactly 
what they pay. 
Elasticity 
Government officials desire a tax that exhibits an automatic revenue 
growth. This protects them from returning regularly to the voters for per­
mission to increase the tax rates every time the demand or cost of public ser­
vices increases. The property tax is not an income-elastic tax. The basic 
problem is that reassessments occur only periodically. In the interim, hence, 
year-to-year growth in revenues is mostly due to additions to the tax base 
through new construction or subdivisions. Building some revenue growth 
into the property tax is no easy matter. Periodic revaluation is the usual ap­
proach. But when revaluation is too infrequent, say every five or ten years, 
it leads to large one-time increases in tax liability and to voter uproar from 
the shock. As a result, countries use various means to cushion the shock, 
but these many times end up reducing the effective rate of property tax. 
Some innovations introduced internationally to deal with the issue of low 
elasticity include indexation used, for example, in Jordan, Colombia, and 
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Brazil, and the phasing-in of the reassessed values, as in the Philippines 
(Guevara and Yoingco, 1997). Neither of these solutions is flawless. 
HOW CAN THE PROPERTY TAX REACH ITS POTENTIAL? 
Two routes to increasing property tax revenue mobilization in developing 
countries exist. One is a move toward fiscal decentralization as a develop­
ment strategy. Even if the property tax share of subnational governments 
did not rise beyond the present level of 18 percent of expenditures, in­
creased expenditure responsibility for subnational governments will lead to 
a higher property tax share of GDP. The second route to an increased rate 
of revenue mobilization is improved tax administration. 
Fiscal Decentralization 
A useful approach to explaining the relative demand for property taxation 
in a country is to view this demand as derived from the demand for fiscal 
decentralization on the part of the national electorate in that country. A rea­
sonable working hypothesis is that countries that seek greater fiscal decen­
tralization will spend more through local governments and will rely more 
heavily on property taxation to finance these expenditures. 
The argument for choosing the property tax is straightforward. Fiscal 
decentralization, to be truly effective, requires autonomous subnational 
government taxes. The criteria for choosing a good subnational government 
tax point to property taxation as a logical choice. Consider the following: 
• A good local tax is one where there is a correspondence between the bound­
aries within which the expenditure benefits are received and the boundaries 
within which the tax burden falls. The property tax comes close to satisfy­
ing this condition for both second-tier and third-tier governments. 
• Under good administration, and with a commitment to provide important 
services, the property tax can be a significant source of revenue for sub-
national governments. Potentially, the tax base is large and income elastic. 
• Subnational governments, particularly third-tier local governments, may 
have a comparative advantage in assessing the property tax base because 
of their familiarity with the local economy and its land use patterns. 
• Higher-level governments are not likely to aggressively compete for the 
right to levy property taxation because it is a high cost method of raising 
revenue, it is politically unpopular, and because central governments do 
not have a comparative advantage in assessing the base. 
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We test the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization drives the intensity of 
use of the property tax with an empirical analysis. The data are down from 
a multicountry panel data set drawn from the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund and from several other 
sources. We measure fiscal decentralization as subnational government 
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures. To test the 
role of fiscal decentralization on the relative use of property taxation, we 
need to control for other variables expected to affect the dependent variable. 
In particular, we expect that reliance on property taxation may he higher 
across countries and over time the greater the degree of urbanization. Both 
land and improvement values tend to increase significantly in value in ur­
ban centers, and with this comes a heightened attractiveness of property 
taxation. We also control in the regression analysis for GDP per capita be­
cause we have seen that for a variety of institutional reasons richer coun­
tries tend to make a higher use of property taxation. Transitional countries 
are identified by a dummy variable. Even controlling for income per capita 
differences, transitional countries present very distinct institutional peculi­
arities such as history of land ownership and titling, which may affect the 
relative use of property taxation. We also control for population size and the 
rate of growth of population. 
The estimation is based on a panel of 70 countries for three years, 1990, 
1995, and 2000. Although data for many of the variables are available an­
nually, the restriction to three years is imposed by the data availability for 
the urban population ratio. Besides the International Monetary Fund GFS, 
we use data from the World Resource Institute6 for GDP per capita, popu­
lation, and population growth rate. The data for urbanization are from the 
United Nations.7 
Because of the possible nonlinear effects of population and GDP per 
capita, these two variables are entered in the regression in logarithms. Given 
the cross-country nature of the data set, there are potentially a number of 
issues specific to each of those countries for which we cannot control in the 
regressions, but may have an impact on the behavior of the dependent vari­
able (property taxes relative to GDP). In this case the appropriate approach 
may be fixed or random effects estimation. However, because we are re­
stricted to three years and because of missing data for some of the variables, 
we end up with an unbalanced panel data set with 107 observations. This does 
not support a fixed effects estimation approach for 70 different countries. 
6 The World Resource Institute, www.earthtrends.wri.org. 
7 "The World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision" from the Population Division of the De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 2004. 
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Instead, we allow for the presence of time effects by using dummy variables 
for 1990 and 1995. 
In table 3.3 we present the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results. The 
need for using 2SLS arises from the potential endogeneity of the main con­
trol variable of interest, the level of fiscal decentralization. It may be that de­
centralization not only affects the relative use of property taxation as hy­
pothesized here, hut also that, in a reverse causation, the presence or 
relative ease of property taxation may also affect the extent of decentraliza­
tion. In fact, the Hausman test for endogeneity shows that we cannot reject 
the possibility that the decentralization variable is indeed endogenous. For 
TABLE 3.3 The Determinants of the Relative Use of Property Taxation 
(Dependent Variable: Property Tax Revenues to GDP), 2SLS Estimation 
Variables Coefficient estimate T-stat Probability >t 
Constant 
Igdpcap 0.008 0.11 0.909 
Ipop -0.306 -6.04 0.000 
p_decent 10.355 4.50 0.000 
urbanpct 1.057 -0.11 0.915 
pgr 57.673 4.83 0.000 
transition 0.005 0.02 0.981 
dy90 -0.237 -1.23 0.222 
dy95 -0.295 -1.61 0.111 
Number of observations 107 
F (8,99) 40.74 
Probability >F 0.0000 
R-squared 0.7670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7482 
Root Mean Square Error 0.7336 
Notes on variables: Igdpcap = logarithm of GDP per capita; Ipop = logarithm of population; p_decent = 
predicted value of decentralization variable from the first stage estimation; urbanpct = percent urban 
population; pgr = rate of population growth; transition = dummy of countries in transition; dy90 = dummy 
for 1990 (the control year is 2000); dy95 = dummy for 1995 (the control year is 2000). 
THE DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE PERFORMANCE |  47 
TABLE 3.4 Fiscal Decentralization Indicators (Percent) 
1970s 1980s 1990s-2000s 
Developing 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
Transitional 
countries 
Subnational 
government 
tax as a share 
of total 
government 
tax 
10.68 
(43) 
17.91 
(24) 
8.87 
.(33) 
18.18 
(23) 
10.61 
I28) 
18.39 
(21) 
22.41 
(23) 
Subnational 
government 
expenditure as 
a share of total 
government 
expenditure 
13.42 
(45) 
33.68 
(23) 
12.09 
(41) 
31.97 
(24) 
12.97 
(54) 
32.68 
(24) 
30.32 
(24) 
Note: Sample sizes are in parentheses. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
this reason we run as an alternative two-stage least squares, where in the 
first stage we use as instruments for decentralization population, popula­
tion growth rate, and per capita GDP. 
Results from the 2SLS estimation show that the coefficient for fiscal de­
centralization is positive and statistically significant. This supports the hy­
pothesis that the demand for the use of property taxation is driven by the 
level of decentralization. The log of population is negative and significant, 
and the growth rate of population is positive and significant. 
We may use these findings to help explain the slow growth of the prop­
erty tax in developing countries, as reported in table 3.1. Based on the sig­
nificant coefficient for decentralization in table 3.3, we can say that, other 
things equal, if the decentralization ratio had increased by 5 percent for 
developing countries in the 1990s, the ratio of property tax revenue of 
GDP would, on average, have been in that decade close to 0.6, or the aver­
age level reached in the 2000s by that group of countries. However, as we 
show in table 3.4, there has been little growth in the fiscal decentralization 
ratio over the past three decades. For developing countries, the level of fis­
cal decentralization, measured by subnational government expenditures 
as a share of total government expenditure, was about 13 percent, on av­
erage, in the 1970s, and was marginally lower in the 1990s and early 
2000s. 
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TABLE 3.5 Ratio of Third-Tier Government Expenditures to Total Subnational 
Government Expenditures, Selected Countries (Percent) 
1990s 2000s 
OECD countries 
(number of countries) 
53.91 
10 . 
46.89 
10 
Developing countries 
(number of countries) 
40.97 
8 
40.63 
8 
All countries 
(number of countries) 
47.44 
18 
29.17 
18 
Notes: The table excludes countries with 100 percent of subnational expenditures at the local level (that 
is, those countries without intermediate regional or provincial governments). The data for 2000s are for 
the five years from 2000 to 2004. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
With an adjusted R-square of 0.75 for the regression in table 3.3, we 
have not explained all of what goes in to determining the intensity of use of 
property taxation. One source of this specification error is the failure to 
account for differences among countries in the fiscal importance of third-
tier (local) governments. For example, the arguments for property taxation 
are that it is a tax most suitable for third-tier local governments, that is, for 
city and municipal local governments that are small enough to capture the 
advantages of familiarity in setting tax rates that reflect voter preferences 
for financing local services and small enough to capture the comparative ad­
vantages of familiarity in assessing property. Thus, a reasonable additional 
hypothesis would be that the larger the importance of local governments in 
the subnational government sector (local plus regional), the higher the in­
tensity of use of property taxation.8 Unfortunately, the International Mone­
tary Fund's GFS does not always show this breakdown (or shows it on an 
inconsistent basis). From the partial evidence in table 3.5, it would seem 
like the relative importance of third-tier (local) governments has declined in 
the 2000s vis-a-vis the 1990s, at least for the case of developed countries. 
Therefore, it is not possible for us to introduce this type of variable in the 
regressions in table 3.3. 
8 A corollary of this reasoning is that other taxes, such as personal income or consumption taxes, are 
more easily applicable at the regional level so that the larger the importance of the intermediate level 
governments in the subnational government sector, the lower the relative use of property taxation 
vis-a-vis other taxes. 
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Improved Administration 
As shown in table 3.1, the property tax share of GDP has not increased 
significantly over the past 30 years. In the previous section of this chap­
ter, we have identified the lack of a deepening of fiscal decentralization as 
a constraint. There are other internal institutional constraints, having to 
do with how property taxes are actually structured and administered, 
that no doubt contribute to the overall lackluster performance of prop­
erty taxation. These factors are especially relevant in the developing 
world. Data are not available for Us to analyze these internal determi­
nants of property tax revenue growth in a regression analysis. However, 
we might use a priori reasoning to speculate on the constraints and then 
try to illustrate these conjectures with examples and information from 
selected countries. 
In order to identify some of the elements at play, we use the following 
identity, which describes the components or steps that go into identifying 
the ratio of property tax revenues to GDP in any particular country. 
Tc ( T  }  1c ( tl ) f AV 1 f  TMV^ f  MV" 
y [TJ  I A V )  [TMV J < MV ) I y ) 
where 
T = *c = property tax revenue collections 
y GDP 
tl = property tax liability 
AV = taxable assessed value 
TMV = taxable market value 
MV = full market value 
The term on the left of the identity is the ratio of property tax revenue 
collections to GDP. It is the wide variation in this ratio (reported in table 
3.1) that we would like to explain. Why do some countries realize a much 
higher effective property tax rate than do others? Our focus here is on the 
components of the tax structure and its implementation, particularly on as­
sessment and collection. 
The first term on the right is the collection ratio, that is, the percentage 
of true liability that is collected. In developing countries, where enforce­
ment is often lax, collection rates as low as 50 percent are normal. Some ex­
amples, presented in table 3.6, support this argument. 
Even the low rates reported in table 3.6 may be overestimates because in 
some cases they include collections of arrears in the numerator, but only 
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TABLE 3.6 Selected Measures of Property Tax Administration 
Country Collection rate 
Assessment 
ratio 
Selected exemptions 
(partial or total) 
Philippines 
(Rosengard 1998; 
Guevara 2004) 
50-60 percent of 
current billings in 
1990 
Legal assessment 
ratios vary from 15 
percent to 80 
percent 
Assessment ratios 
vary by value class 
and by property use 
Jamaica 
(Sjoquist 2004) 
40 percent in 2004 The median 
assessment ratio 
was 11 percent 
between the 
general revaluations 
Certain agricultural 
properties 
Chile 
(Rosengard 1998) 
73 percent in 1990 — Two-thirds of all 
property is exempt 
indonesia 
(Rosengard 1998) 
80 percent in 1990 Legal assessment 
rates of 20 percent 
— 
Kenya 
(Kelly 2004) 
10-60 percent Actual rates vary 
between 20 percent 
and 70 percent 
Colombia 
(Iregui et al. 2004; 
Bird 2004) 
80 percent 70 percent in 
Bogota, 85 percent 
in Medillin 
Source: Various works cited in the table. 
current year liabilities in the denominator. Moreover, the demand for prop­
erty tax payments may be based on a very low assessment ratio. 
The second term, the ratio of tax liability to assessed value, describes the 
tax rate. The higher the legal tax rates, the higher value of this term. Gov­
ernments in all countries face great pressure to keep the nominal rates low 
because of the unpopularity of the property tax. A typical range for tax rates 
under a capital value system may be between 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent, 
but can be much lower. The statutory rate is set to achieve a revenue target, 
given the size of the tax base and the assessment ratio. 
The third term is the ratio of assessed value to taxable market value. 
This term varies with the efficiency of the valuation process. It also is af­
fected by discretionary decisions to reduce the taxable base by applying an 
assessment ratio that is less than 1:0, for example, in the case of classified 
property taxes where industrial and residential properties often are as­
signed different assessment ratios. If no discretionary assessment ratio were 
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TABLE 3.7 Simulated Impacts of Alternative Property Tax Administration Reform 
Vv= IVrL) <Tl/AV) (AWTMV) (TMV/MV) (MV/y) 
Baseline 0.6 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.8 60 
Scenario 1 0.84 0.7 0,05 0.5 0.8 60 
Scenario 2 0.9 0.5 0.05 0.75 0.8 60 
Scenario 3 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.5 1.0 60 
Scenario 4 1.58 0.7 0.05 0.75 1.0 60 
Note Bold figures indicate parameter deviations from baseline values. 
applied and all properties on the roll were valued at 100 percent of full mar­
ket value, this ratio would be 1.0. The overwhelming evidence from devel­
oping countries is that properties are dramatically underassessed. In prac­
tice, valuation rates can be as low as 20 percent. Some evidence on the 
degree of variation in assessment ratios is given in table 3.7. Even these 
very low estimates may he an overstatement because they do take into ac­
count the fact that many properties are not valued at all. 
The ratio of taxable market value to total market value indicates the im­
pact of exemptions and preferential treatments on the property tax base, as 
well as exclusions. In many countries sizeable exemptions have been pro­
vided, depleting the tax base. These range from preferential treatment for 
homeowners to property tax holidays for new businesses. Again, some in­
dicative evidence is presented in table 3.6. For example, in the case of Chile, 
two-thirds of all property is reported to be exempt. Another cause for the di­
vergence between taxable market value and total market value is the failure 
to discover and incorporate new construction to the tax rolls. 
Finally, the ratio of market value of real property to GDP tells us how 
property values match up to total output in the economy. For example, in an 
urbanized country, one might expect a higher (and growing) ratio of market 
value of property to total GDP. Local governments can exert little short-run 
control over this component of revenue performance. 
What this identity tells us is that the reasons for the poor revenue per­
formance of the property tax in developing countries are numerous, but are 
largely within the control of the local governments. 
The importance of this point can be illustrated with a simple simulation 
that identifies the potential revenue impacts of local government adminis­
trative reform, as shown in table 3.7. In the columns we show the compo­
nents of the property tax identity presented earlier, for example, in column 
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1 is the ratio of property tax to GDP, in column 2 is the collection rate, and 
so on. The first row of table 3.7 shows the baseline simulation, where the 
values of all the parameters are reasonably chosen so that the resulting 
property tax effort is 0.6 percent of GDP, the international average for de­
veloping countries as reported in table 3.1. The parameters of concern are 
the collection rate, the assessment ratio, and the exemption policy, and in 
those cases we have chosen values that seem more or less reflective of the 
actual practice. Apart from these policy variables, there are two controls 
that we do not vary in the simulations. A statutory tax rate of about 0.5 
percent seems a reasonable assumption. The ratio of market value to GDP 
(which may hold many other factors) is calculated as a residual to satisfy 
the identity. 
The results of the simple simulation show the following: 
• In row 2 we vary only the collection rate from 50 percent to 70 percent. 
The result is that the property tax ratio to GDP increases from 0.6 percent 
to 0.84 percent, an increase of 40 percent. 
• In row 3 we vary only the assessment ratio from 50 percent to 75 percent. 
The result is that the property tax share of GDP rises to 0.9, an increase of 
nearly 50 percent. 
• In row 4 we eliminate exemptions and do not change anything else. The 
result is that the property tax share of GDP rises to 0.75, an increase 
of about 25 percent. 
• In row 5 we vary all three of these factors together and estimate a more 
than doubling of the property tax share of GDP. 
This simple simulation illustrates well that plausible improvements in 
government administrative and design practices can move the property tax to 
a much more significant place in the revenue system of developing countries. 
Getting property taxes to rise 1 percent of GDP implies a significant jump in 
the financing capacity of local governments in many countries around the 
world. In table 3.8 we report the results of an additional simple simulation to 
illustrate that point. If for the sample of countries in our data set (used to run 
the regression reported in table 3.3) we select first those countries that collect 
less than 1 percent of GDP in property taxes, and then we allow those coun­
tries to collect up to 1 percent of GDP in property taxes, the average increase 
in subnational government revenues would be around one-third. 
Improvements in the administration parameters are possible and clearly 
can be made. But they are not easily made. Even more bothersome is the fact 
that big efforts are often put together to improve one of two of the critical pa­
rameters just to see the deterioration of other parameters with overall little 
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TABLE 3.8 Simulations of Revenue Implications of Property Taxes Representing 
1 Percent of GDP, Year 2000 (21 Countries) 
Selected countries 
Actual property 
tax per GDP 
(percent) 
Percentage revenue 
increase of subnational 
government by topping 
1 percent of GDP 
Austria 0.1 4.7 
Bulgaria 0.3 9.2 
Chile 0.7- 13.1 
Croatia 0.5 9.2 
Czech Republic 0.5 1.4 
Estonia 0.5 7.7 
Ethiopia 0.2 7.0 
Hungary 0.7 2.2 
Indonesia 0.1 66.0 
Iran 0.2 45.5 
Italy 0.9 0.6 
Jamaica 0.2 141.9 
Lithuania 0.6 6.0 
Romania 0.5 11.5 
Slovak Republic 0.6 17.8 
Slovenia 0.7 3.9 
Sri Lanka 0.7 79.9 
Swaziland 0.1 130.0 
Thailand 0.3 34.5 
Uganda 0.1 20.1 
Ukraine 0.0 9.2 
Mean values 0.4 29.6 
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impact on actual revenue collections. For example, Dillinger (1988) reports 
how the Philippines' Property Tax Administration Project was successful in 
producing tax maps and updated property assessments, but this effort never 
yielded a substantial increase in revenue because the poor collection prac­
tices were never addressed. Even though valuations increased by 37.5 per­
cent and collectibles by 13.6 percent, actual tax revenues increased by only 
1.1 percent. In contrast, as Kelly (1993) reports, the Indonesian reform was 
more successful. By focusing on improved collection efficiency and im­
proved valuation and assessment, property collection efficiency rose from 
65 percent to 79 percent, and the share of property tax revenue in total own 
source revenue almost doubled between 1990 and 1991. 
THE FUTURE OF THE PROPERTY TAX 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Making property taxes work in developing and transitional countries is a 
complex challenge. Although many internal and external factors are in­
volved, we speculate that the future of the property tax in these countries 
depends mainly on four factors: (1) the efficacy of shortcuts to valuation of 
property; (2) technology catch-up; (3) the willingness of the central govern­
ments to give local governments access to other productive tax bases; and 
(4) the pace of decentralization. 
Factor 1: Administrative Shortcuts 
Administrative cost is arguably the biggest constraint to the growth of the 
property tax. For the revenue it generates, it is just too expensive to prop­
erly levy and enforce. So countries are turning increasingly to shortcuts to 
address this problem. Introducing notional valuation based on location and 
area, self-assessment, indexing between valuation periods, and exempting 
properties that are hard to tax are all examples of such shortcuts. Will these 
innovations save the property tax or destroy it? 
The approach that seems to be gaining currency in developing countries 
is area-based assessment. This is both inexpensive to do and understand­
able enough to be acceptable to taxpayers. However, at base it requires a 
judgmental assessment of value per square meter in each of the valuation 
zones prescribed by the regional or local government, and it requires judg­
ment in setting the boundaries of the zone. The resulting notional values 
will require adjustment each year to build any elasticity into the property 
tax, and the zone boundaries may need to be changed periodically. More­
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over, the idea that all properties in a zone can be subjected to the same no­
tional valuation per area unit will turn out to be an enemy of fairness in 
property taxation. Area-based assessments are likely to improve the revenue 
yield of the tax and to give a better ratio of administrative cost to collec­
tions, but local governments are not likely to move to a higher intensity of 
property tax use with this approach to valuation. 
Factor 2: Technology 
Will technology save property tax administration in developing countries? In 
fact, developing countries appear to be closing the technology gap at a much 
faster rate than they are closing the income gap. Can new technologies such as 
computerized mass appraisal, satellite-aided mapping, and cross-referencing9 
circumvent the high costs and time delays associated with the valuation pro­
cess? Will it soon be possible for local governments to keep up-to-date records 
of land characteristics and ownership? If new technologies in property tax 
assessment, collection, and record keeping do catch on, they could minimize 
much of the current problem with the property tax in developing nations. 
Factor 3: Alternative Revenue Sources 
Will central governments release other productive revenue sources to local 
governments? Examples are payroll taxes, piggyback personal income taxes 
and excises, business taxes, and taxes on the use and ownership of motor 
vehicles. To the extent these "easier" tax sources are available to local gov­
ernments, the property tax might be minimized as a subnational govern­
ment revenue source. 
Property taxation is still full of potential, but also full of uncertainty, 
as an instrument for bringing revenues and accountability to subnational 
governments in developing and transitional countries. 
Factor 4: Decentralization 
Despite being one of the hottest development strategies in the past two de­
cades, decentralization has hardly taken off (see table 3.4). Although there 
are now many more decentralized and decentralizing developing countries 
than in the past, the average expenditure share of subnational governments 
in total government spending is considerably less than in developed coun­
tries and has barely budged from its 15 percent level in the 1970s. However, 
9 Dillinger (1989) describes the successful practice in some Brazilian municipalities of using data pro­
vided by other agencies to flag changes in the tax base. 
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more elected officials are bringing pressure, there is a continuing reaction 
against central governments that have become too controlling, and there is a 
political strategy to promote bringing governments closer to people. All of 
this could lead to increased decentralization. As decentralizing countries 
turn to the job of identifying revenue sources for local governments, an 
expanded property tax will be an obvious choice. Moreover, the increased 
local government expenditure responsibility that comes with fiscal decen­
tralization will give an increased incentive for undertaking difficult admin­
istrative reforms. 
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